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Niebuhr Society: Reinhold Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society  November 17, 2007 
American Academy of Religion, San Diego California 
 
DRAFT 
Niebuhr’s Immoral Society and Bellah’s Good Society: 
A Conversation about Moral Man 
 
Harlan Stelmach 
Dominican University of California 
 
 
 
I. Framing the Project 
 
 The title of my paper is an indication of where I began my thinking about this 
project.  I was convinced from the start that Niebuhr’s and Bellah’s most significant 
disagreement would be how they viewed the role of collective life.  Second, I assumed    
that they would have their most significant area of agreement on the moral capacity and 
responsibility of individuals.  If you focus on Niebuhr’s early work, especially in Moral 
Man and Immoral Society and Bellah’s mature work today, these assumptions are 
generally true.  Further, I still expected some broad lines of continuity in the work of 
these two committed “orthodox” Christians speaking from a “realist” perspective about 
their faith and their commitment to just societies.  Again, the continuity is present, 
especially in their many parallel insights and in their commitment to a socially engaged 
Christianity, working in conversation with many of the same social thinkers, either 
personally or through their writings.  Needless to say, this only begins to tell the story of 
two complex social thinkers, speaking from what they considered to be profound 
theological truths about the world.  The full story of the continuity and discontinuity of 
Bellah and Niebuhr will have to unfold with more work on this project by many others.  
What I offer is a way to get started and to involve others in the project. 
 2 
My task as I understood it for today’s proceedings was to read Niebuhr’s Moral 
Man and Immoral Society through the lens of Robert Bellah’s work. Therefore, the 
themes I review in this paper are, though largely dictated by where I see Bellah’s work 
extending Niebuhr, they are still at the heart of Moral Man and most of Niebhur’s work.  
In fact, for many years I have operated with the conviction that Bellah is a “Christian 
Realist” in the Niebuhrian tradition.
1
  A discussion of Bellah and Niebuhr at the Niebuhr 
Society was an obvious good choice to me.  I am not alone in this conviction.  In The 
Good Society, Bellah’s co-authored work with Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, 
Ann Swidler and Seven M. Tipton, Reinhold Niebuhr is cited twelve times.  Reinhold, 
and H. Richard Niebuhr, are key conversation partners for Bellah and his colleagues in 
their collaborative books, Habits of the Heart and The Good Society.  The last paragraph 
in Good Society establishes this importance.  After acknowledging John Dewey and 
Walter Lippmann as figures, “typically American in their several ways, [who] 
transcended America,” they conclude with:  
Reinhold Niebuhr, H. Richard Niebuhr, and John Courtney Murray always 
asserted a primary allegiance that entirely transcended the nation, and held 
America under the judgment of God.  All of them invoked a vigorous public life 
as essential to a good society.  And all of them in their own way reminded us that 
the purpose of the public lies beyond its own boundaries, however inclusive they 
may become, in the service and the celebration of the greater city, that 
cosmopolis, that universal community, of which all of us, our regions, our 
nations, are citizens.
2
 
 
Bellah and his co-authors, plant themselves in the broad river of social Christianity and as 
we will see with a new twist, in its “realist” tributary. There is no equivalency between 
                                                 
1
 See my article: “Civil Religion in the Interfaith  Context of Northern California: Revisiting Robert 
Bellah’s Broken Covenant Project,” Pacific Coast Theological Society Presentation, November 6, 2004. 
Available on line at the Society’s on-line peer reviewed journal.  
2
 Robert N. Bellah, Richard Madsen, William Sullivan, Ann Swidler, Steven Tipton, The Good Society, 
New York: Vintage Books, 1992 [1991] p.306. 
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the human “good society” and the “universal community.”  The nation is under the 
judgment of God.  It is therefore no surprise that this year’s recipient of the Martin Marty 
award for “contributions to the public understanding of religion” at our meetings this 
week at The American Academy of Religion (AAR) is Robert Bellah. 
The general assumption of this paper is that Bellah sustains many of the elements 
of Christian Realism that have been associated with Reinhold Niebuhr and others.  The 
significance of Bellah, I will also argue, is that he has extended and deepened many of 
these elements.  I will attempt to demonstrate this by focusing on two themes, the 
“individual and society” and the relationship of “idealism and realism.”  For another 
paper I am adding the theme, “working for justice.”  That is, how they put their ideas into 
practice in the modern societies.  However, I will allude to this theme in this paper as it 
relates to the other two themes. 
 
Celebration of Reinhold Niebuhr’s Moral Man and Immoral Society 
 In a profound sense, this paper is really about Niebuhr.  It is an attempt to give 
Niebuhr proper credit for his essential contribution to those of us motivated by social 
Christianity.  Celebration and gratitude are appropriate not just out of politeness or 
curiosity of the 75
th
 anniversary of Moral Man and Immoral Society, but because so 
many stand on the shoulders of  Niebuhr’s engagement with the world with his realist 
theological convictions.  In addition to Bellah, so many have acknowledged their debt to 
him.  My favorite is Martin Luther King Jr.’s tribute to Niebuhr in Stride Toward 
Freedom: 
During my last year in theological school, I began to read the works of Reinhold 
Niebuhr.  The prophetic and realistic elements in Niebuhr’s passionate style and 
 4 
profound thought were appealing to me, and I became so enamored of his social 
ethics that I almost fell into the trap of accepting uncritically everything he 
wrote.
3
 
 
Many scholars and activists have been captivated by Niebuhr’s thought, for the simple 
reason that his passion is captivating.  One quote to “celebrate” from Moral Man is in 
order: 
Furthermore there must always be a religious element in the hope of a just 
society.  Without the ultra rational hopes and passions of religion no society will 
ever have the courage to conquer despair and attempt the impossible; for the 
vision of a just society is an impossible one, which can be approximated only by 
those who do not regard it as impossible.  The truest visions of religion are 
illusions which may be partially realized by being resolutely believed.  For what 
religion believes to be true is not wholly true but ought to be true; and may 
become true if its truth is not doubted.
4
 
 
Whether or not you agree with his position or not, you may think you should because of 
the force of his passion. During Niebuhr’s lifetime, when preaching from the pulpit, 
words like these were powerful. 
The number of scholarly works devoted to Niebuhr is staggering.  The number of 
doctoral dissertations treating his thought can never be totally accounted for.  They all are 
witness to his impact and contribution to the role of religious conviction and its 
engagement with in public life.  One doctoral dissertation, however, came to my attention 
recently.  A doctor of ministry dissertation situated a case study of a “liberal” Protestant  
“mission education” organization in the river of social Christianity.  The figures chosen 
to represent this river of thought and action were Charles Finney, Walter Rauschenbusch, 
                                                 
3
 Martin Luther King Jr. Stride Toward Freedom, The Montgomery Story, New York, Perennial Library, 
Harper and Row, 1964 [1958] p. 79. 
4
 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960 [1932] p. 
81. 
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Reinhold Niebuhr, Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Bellah
5
.  The usual subjects are 
represented.  Though today it is not surprising to find King and Bellah in the cast of 
characters, at least from my perspective. For many he fills the void that many have felt 
with the absence of the public intellectuals, with stature, from the religious community 
with the death of the Niebuhrs.  Also, there is no shortage of passion in Bellah, as he 
readily admits to sermonic presentations. 
 However, beyond celebration of the passion of Moral Man and the anecdotal 
evidence of others’ debt to Niebuhr, I want to suggest that Moral Man still represents 
much of the quintessential Niebuhr, in style, method and substance.  You can find traces, 
if not full elements, of all of his later works in Moral Man.  It was his building block if 
not a firm foundation for his later works.  And therefore, the substance as well as the 
passion is what make this extraordinary book essential reading for an understanding of 
the challenge for Christian Realism today.  My confidence on this point is based on 
where I detect Niebuhr pushing the limits and edges of his own positions and particularly 
his inherited Protestant worldview in the early 30’s. (Perhaps he never fully escaped from 
it; but to his credit he kept trying).  In addition, in Moral Man he has begun to expand his 
conversation partners to include more secular and non-Protestant thinkers. And most 
significant to me, and for the future of Christian Realism, is his constant “hope” for a 
positive role for collectives, even while he is most certain that it will not likely happen 
without some major negative consequences.  These are what I will call some of the  
“openings” in Moral Man.  His instinct was to continue to work at these edges.  Now 
                                                 
5
 Hugh Brinley Wire, Uncovering a Theology of Social Ministry, A Case Study, San Anselmo, Calif.: 
Doctor of Ministry Dissertation. 1987. 
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others such as Bellah, can help us continue to push the edges that he began to soften and 
on occasion broke through. 
 
Approach, Assumptions and Tentative Thesis 
I have undertaken a three-step process on each of the two themes that I will 
address in this paper.  As mentioned above I will treat the themes of: 1) the individual 
and society and, 2) the relationship of idealism and realism.  First, for each of the themes 
I will first suggest where Niebuhr “got it right” or was at least “on the mark” for his time.  
Or, at least, he offers us a penetrating perspective or insight that we still need to take 
seriously, for he is always grappling with and trying to illumine a constructive social role 
for Christianity.  Also, as part of this first step analysis, I will suggest that he was trying 
to come to grips with the limitations of his own insight which prompted him to 
continually temper even his most defined positions.  He does this by taking seriously the 
criticisms of his conversation partners.  It is here that I use the work of two of his 
conversation partners, H. Richard Niebuhr and the Jesuit, John Courtney Murray.  
Second, I will focus on what I consider to be “openings” in his thought that were either 
there from the beginning or were the result of changes made in responding to his 
conversation partners.  I will suggest that these openings are some of the most important 
points of connection with Bellah’s work.  Third, I will attempt to show that these and 
other areas of Niebuhr’s thought, are being sustained by Bellah.  Further, I will explore 
how Bellah’s “realism” extends and deepens Niebuhr’s focus on the creative side of 
human nature and its positive potential for the religious [and human] imagination.  In 
these sections I want to at least suggest that Niebuhr’s normative side (i.e. coming from is 
 7 
faith and theology) suggests more potential (if not a mandate) to be realized (at least in a 
partial sense) in the collective life of individuals.  This is also accomplished by Bellah, 
with no less a concern about the evil potential of collective life and no less a sense of the 
need for a prophetic voice in the world.  Bellah is even comfortable with part of his 
vocation as a modern day Jeremiah.
6
  Though as we will see below he is eventually 
critical of just the prophetic voice in creating the “good society.” 
In order to make this paper manageable, I have largely restricted my analysis to 
several key texts.  For Niebuhr, other than Moral Man, it seemed wise to focus on his last 
major work, Man’s Nature and His Communities, published in 1965.  These two texts 
seem to function as bookends for his other works.  But more importantly, Man’s Nature 
is Niebuhrs’ self-described book as containing “the systematic essays [that] are intended 
to ‘revise’ previously held opinions only in the sense that they seek to give a systematic 
account of the revisions which have taken place in the author’s mind in a whole lifetime 
of study and writing books too frequently.”
7
  With one exception I have not 
systematically waded into the vast secondary material on Niebuhr.  Robin Lovin’s 
Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism
8
 proved to be helpful for my last section of this 
paper where I speculate on the legacy and future of Christian Realism.  Lovin is 
important to me for he seemed to reinforce my view of the “hopeful Niebuhr.”  But I 
have to admit that I went looking for this side of Niebuhr, even in Moral Man.  Perhaps 
my projections on to Niebuhr, if in the end that is what they are, could have been 
corrected by others.  I thought that looking at Niebuhr again through fresh eyes could be 
                                                 
6
 Robert Bellah and Steven M. Tipton, eds., The Robert Bellah Reader, Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006,p. 339. 
7
 Reinhold Niebuhr, Man’s Nature and His Communities, Essays on the Dynamics and Enigma’s of Man’s 
Personal and Social Existence, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1965. p15. 
8
 Robin Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
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of benefit.  I do have to admit that re-reading my doctoral comprehensive on Reinhold 
Niebuhr that was guided by John Bennett, does give me pause for my capacity for an 
“objective” understanding of Niebuhr.
9
 Perhaps more on this confession later.  But I do 
apologize to many on this panel
10
 for not being more familiar with your work.  I am 
certainly motivated to become more familiar now. 
The Bellah’s texts  I have used are more numerous.  Yet I have tried to focus 
largely on The Good Society and connect his other works to this book, which I think most 
profoundly and systematically exhibits his version of Christian Realism.  Habits of the 
Heart has been used to demonstrate how it anticipates The Good Society.  The Robert 
Bellah Reader is an indispensable resource, especially for essays post The Good Society, 
to see his application of Good Society and his growing critique of Protestantism.  I also 
have had access to some unpublished manuscripts of Bellah’s. They continue to explore 
the themes in The Good Society and increasingly connect to his forthcoming treatment of 
“religious evolution.”
11
   
 I have also tried to manifest the sentiment that Bellah has suggested for looking 
critically and appreciatively at other individuals’ work.  He quotes Charles Taylor, one of 
his conversation partners, when he is analyzing and evaluating the work of other authors 
and traditions. When referring to the problematic of Catholicism and  modernity, Bellah 
                                                 
9
 At the time in the early 70’s I was focused on the “early” Niebuhr to help bolster my commitment to my 
anti-capitalistic movements and various the “updated” Marxist critiques.  This led me to found the journal, 
Radical Religion, named after Niebuhr’s 1930’s precursor to Christianity and Society and eventually 
Christianity and Crisis.  I also helped to found the Bay Area chapter of Christians for Socialism, which I 
saw as inheriting the mantel of Niebuhr’s Fellowship of Socialist Christians, but without the “mistakes,” 
they made.  We failed to learn the Niebuhr lesson of the sin of pride. 
10
 The panel for the Society includes: Gary Dorrien, Union Theological Seminary, Charles Mathewes, 
University of Virginia, Rebekah Miles, Southern Methodist University, Max Stackhouse, Princeton 
Theological Seminary, Ronald Stone, Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, ad Josiah Young, Wesley 
Theological Seminary. 
11
 I fit the category of  “one of Bellah’s students,” and have remained so over the years through friendship.  
See D. Michael Lindsay’s review of the The Robert Bellah Reader 
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refers to what he calls “Charles Taylor’s admonition that we neither uncritically affirm or 
uncritically deny modernity.”  As Bellah quotes Taylor: 
The view I would like to defend…is that in modern, secularist culture there are 
mingled together both authentic developments of the gospel of an incarnational 
mode of life, and also a closing off to God that negates the gospel.  The notion is 
that modern culture, in breaking with the structures and beliefs of Christendom, 
also carries certain facts of Christian life further than they ever were taken, or 
could have been taken within Christendom.  In relation to the earlier forms of 
Christian culture, we have to face the humbling realization that the breakout was a 
necessary condition of the development.
12
 [Italics Added] 
 
In a similar fashion I have approached this project.  The substance of Talyor’s remark is 
also intriguing.  Perhaps one can detect a “realist” standpoint.  Bellah’s participation on 
the panel to discuss Charles Taylor’s new book the week at AAR should be instructive. 
 However the approach to “humbly” and appreciatively read Niebuhr,  has led me 
to be intrigued with what emerged for me as one of  the key points of connection between 
Niebuhr and Bellah,  their hopefulness.  Yes, their hopefulness! And this is so in the 
midst of heavy doses of prophetic despair, which they also share.  I think the clues are in 
Moral Man, certainly in the “celebration quote” above; and it is certainly in The Good 
Society.  Robin Lovin uses the concept, “confidence,” for Niebuhr.  Bellah uses the 
theological conviction of  “hope.”  Niebuhr’s and  Bellah’s  legacy for a viable Christian 
Realism is the fact that they have remained hopeful and motivated to work for justice in 
spite of their sense of evil in the world.  As I will develop later, it is precisely because of 
their similar views of Christian of “grace.”  Robin Lovin put it this way: 
Niebuhr’s Christian Realism was both confident and critical.  It was critical 
because he made no absolute claims for his own perspective. Faith can be 
distorted by self-interest, lulled into sentimental piety, or lured into fanatical 
excesses.  Niebuhr could analyze those errors with clarity and urgency born of the 
conviction that they are never far removed from even our most sincere efforts to 
                                                 
12
 Bellah, Bellah Reader, p. 459 
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find moral and political truth.  Yet, after all the critical insights, Niebuhr 
remained confident that Christian Realism made more sense of the problematic 
historical situations than other interpretations.  Niebuhr’s criticism required no 
retreat into a language of faith that was impervious to challenge.  He was 
confident that when subjected to those same criticisms, ‘the truth of faith is 
correlated with all truths which may be known by scientific and philosophical 
disciplines and proves itself a resource for coordinating them into a deeper and 
wider system of coherence.’ [Italics Added]
13
 
 
Therefore, for Lovin, “a reinterpretation of Niebuhr’s Christian Realism must capture 
both the criticism and the confidence.”  This same insight was captured by John A. Sims 
in a very suggestive book entitled, Missionaries to the Skeptics, Christian Apologists for 
the Twentieth Century, C.S. Lewis, Edward John Carnell and Reinhold Niebuhr:   
The three apologists did not have the same understanding of the character of 
biblical authority…but they were all secure enough in their convictions 
concerning its truth claims that they were willing to subject it to the demands of 
public verification.  The were convinced that Christians can enter into the 
problematics of philosophy, the social and natural sciences, and all other 
academic and social challenges with the full assurance that no real contradiction 
will ever exist between what true reason discovers and the truth that has been 
revealed through the Christian faith.[Italics Added]
14
 
 
It seems to me that this insight is at the core of social Christianity at its best, not a simple 
appropriation of the latest “empirical insight,” but mutual criticism.  Therefore, a 
tentative thesis for this paper must account for the critical and confident nature of 
Niebuhr and how Bellah continues to sustain, expand and deepen this perspective in his 
work.  Neither Bellah nor Niebuhr considered themselves theologians, but it was their 
theological realism that gave them hope.  Bellah often quips that he is not optimistic but 
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 Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 30-31 
14
 John A. Sims, Missionaries to the Skeptics, Christian Apologists for the Twentieth Century, C.S. Lewis, 
Edward John Carnell and Reinhold Niebuhr, Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1995. A couple of  
side notes of interest.  This was published the same year as Lovin’s book.  Bellah received the C.S. Lewis 
award for teaching of religion in 2000 and Carnell studied at Harvard Divinity School, wrote a major work 
on Reinhold Niebuhr and as professor and President of Fuller Theological Seminary helped to craft its 
special place in evangelical protestant training. 
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he is hopeful, and he continues, “hope is a theological conviction.”  But this is more than 
a mere quip for Bellah. What are the ways in which Niebuhr and Bellah tried to express 
this similarity?  And in what ways did they depart, if at all, on crucial insights? 
 Moral Man and Immoral Society is not Bellah’s favorite text of Niebuhr’s.  In The 
Good Society it is referred to as Niebuhr’s “angry” book.  For certain it is Niebuhr 
expressing his outrage about the intransigence of multiple forms of sentimentalism, 
idealism, self-delusion, hypocrisy and a lack of self-reflective social intelligence.  But a 
more substantive criticism is also mentioned in The Good Society, one from H. Richard 
Niebuhr.  He accused his brother of false logic and a false theology in Moral Man and 
Immoral Society, particularly relative to his basic thesis about the role of the individual 
and collective life. At a minimum he felt that Reinhold was overstating the moral 
character of individuals.  Bellah has also remarked in conversation that this was certainly 
Niebuhr’s most “individual” book.  Though Niebuhr throughout his life sustained a 
criticism against American and Protestant individualism, and in Moral Man this is no 
exception, then in what sense is Moral Man too much about the individual?  In what 
follows, I have tried to stay close to the actual words of Niebuhr and Bellah.  This 
seemed important for several reasons. First, they were using words for a considered 
purpose.  Second, though understanding their general approach is important, specific 
arguments and key passages needed to be lifted up to get the full weight of their 
convictions.  Third, as I interpret key texts I am offering a fuller view of any potential 
misreading of the texts.  This has created a much longer paper than I wanted; but at this 
phase of the project I seemed to have no choice. 
 
 12 
II. The Individual and Society 
 
Reinhold Niebuhr 
 Niebuhr’s individual, “moral man,”
15
 that is, his generic individual, is 
communicated to us in at least four ways: 1) the American individual under the influence 
of American Protestantism; 2) the private human being, flawed but capable of virtuous 
acts if baser instincts are tempered by reason and religion; 3) historic examples of 
individuals acting out the drama of Niebuhr’s two conceptions, this would include 
Niebuhr himself and; 4) the individual with other individuals acting together in collective 
life, including the family, social movements, society and nation states.  We can best 
understand his individual, and his “realistic” understanding of it, as we focus on what 
happens when individuals act together in a collective.  Beginning with Moral Man, 
according to Niebuhr, the individual’s flaws get multiplied, which creates a collective life 
that can never match up to the best to which individuals are capable.  But Niebuhr says it 
best in his own passionate words. After apologizing for stating the case too 
“unqualifiedly” in his title “Moral Man and Immoral Society” Niebuhr says: 
Individual men may be moral in the sense that they are able to consider interests 
other than their own in determining problems of conduct, and are capable, on 
occasion of preferring the advantages of others to their own.  The are endowed by 
nature with a measure of sympathy and consideration for their kind…Their 
rational faculty prompts them to a sense of justice which educational discipline 
may refine and purge of egoistic elements until they are able to view a social 
situation, in which their own interests are involved with a fair measure of 
objectivity.  But all these achievements are more difficult, if not impossible, for 
human societies and social groups.  In every human group there is less reason to 
guide and check impulse, less capacity for self-transcendence, less ability to 
comprehend the needs of others and therefore more unrestrained egoism than the 
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 I have retained the concept “moral man” whenever referring to Niebuhr’s formulation of the individual.  I 
have tried to use inclusive language when analyzing the issue of the nature of human individuals.  
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individuals, who compose the group, reveal in their personal relations. [Italics 
Added]
16
 
  
 The inferior moral capacity of collective life, according to Niebuhr, is due to two 
factors.  First, it relates to the need for social cohesion in societies as the primary goal.  
“Self regard” for cohesion is difficult to overcome with a countervailing  rationality.  
Second, it is due to a “compound[ing] of the egoistic impulses of individuals, which 
achieve a more vivid expression and a more cumulative effect when they are united in a 
common impulse than when they express themselves separately and discreetly.”
17
  This is 
the formulation of the individual in relationship to the group that is most important for us 
to understand the extent to which Niebuhr sustained this view and how he began to 
nuance it.  Certainly it is a formulation that he never totally changed.  He in fact he made 
a special point to reaffirm it, though slightly softening it, with the 1960 reprinting of 
Moral Man and again with his final book, Man’s Nature and His Communities in 1965.  I 
will present two criticisms of this formulation one by Niebuhr’s brother and the other by 
Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray.  Murray’s criticism will lead us to eventually 
to Bellah’s approach to the relationship of individuals to their collective life.  But first a 
brief exploration on Niebuhr’s concerns about American individualism and a brief 
appreciation of Niebuhr’s position on human nature and his early formulation of the 
dynamic of collectives. 
 In Moral Man, Niebuhr particularly ascribes what he calls “individualism of the 
nineteenth century political economy” to the privileged class which when tied to the 
“sanctification of prudential virtues in Puritan Protestantism” created a justification for 
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 Niebuhr, Moral Man, pp. xii. 
17
 Niebuhr, Moral Man p. xi. 
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the hypocrisy of dominant groups to falsely justify their moral superiority.  It was an 
illusion to justify special advantages, particularly the wealth and property of the middle 
class over against their self-serving view of the less industrious, and less thrifty working 
class.  It was an individualistic creed that Niebuhr continued to suggest that promoted the 
illusion of “self-reliance that teaches us how to be prosperous.”  In Man’s Nature he 
traces his own relationship to this Protestant individualism.  The essays in his last 
monograph,  “give an historical account of the tortuous path of the author’s mind in 
adjusting the original Protestant heritage of individualism and perfectionism” to a new 
age.  One he characterized as “highly technical” with a “collective culture.”  He even 
suggests that Jewish and Catholic faith, with a greater awareness of “the social substance 
of man’s existence” are more appropriate to this “collectivist age” than what he called 
“extravagant Protestantism.”   
 This movement in his thought is an illustration of an “opening” to soften his 
seemingly unbridgeable gulf of “moral man and immoral society.”  However, in Man’s 
Nature he has held on to his basic dichotomy of Moral Man which he referred to in the 
Introduction  as an “obvious” thesis, “that collective self-regard of class, race, and nation 
is more stubborn and persistent than the egoism of individuals.”
18
  He never fully lets go 
of this dichotomy.  Why?  I think it is partly due to his stance in the Protestant mindset 
that John Courtney Murray will address below.   And it is partly due to the nature of his 
dialectical method that we will also explore below.   We will return to these points below 
when using the lens of Bellah to get behind the difficulty of Niebuhr to fully move 
beyond his Protestantism and therefore this gulf between the individual and society.  A 
journey to understand the limitations of Protestantism Bellah, admits to as still an 
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 Niebuhrr, Man’s Nature, p.22. 
 15 
ongoing project for his work.  Using this Bellah lens lead us to begin, however with H. 
Richard Niebuhr and Murray.  But first an appreciation of Niebuhr’s most stark 
formulation of the almost “impossible” morality of groups. 
 At an important level, I think Niebuhr’s consistent formulation about the 
collective moral intransigence compared to individual moral intransigence “rings true.”  I 
think we all can give an example from our experience when fighting what we thought 
was an injustice, that we came up against an institutional response such as, “we just 
cannot do that because we have policies we have to follow.”  Or when a corporate body, 
whether a business, educational institution or a church body, feels attacked, they go 
behind closed doors and hunker down to do “damage control.”  No doubt we all have 
played this role in this drama of institutional life.  We only have to look to the Catholic 
Church and its handling of the sex abuse scandal to see this dynamic at work.  Behind 
closed doors, a self-protective “feeding frenzy” of “us against them” occurs. No doubt 
one of the justifications is that the challenging group is just as likely to be employing the 
same self-deception as the institutional power it is challenging.  Our desire to maintain 
the vital social cohesion of the group could be used as a justification.  We might say, “if 
order is lost, we will have anarchy, the prisoners will be running the jail.” At our most 
“generous” moments we might even suggest, “if we could just sit down face to face as 
‘individuals of good will,’ we could work things out.”  If I was honest with myself, I can 
think of times when I just used this as a strategy as a leader of the challenging group to 
just get a chance to argue my case rather than listen to the position of others.    I think at a 
very basic level this is the insight about human nature about which Niebuhr is drawing 
our attention.  And further, he feels that this insight is consistent with his Christian view 
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of human nature in its “sinful,” state.  This is not the complete story about human 
capacity for Niebuhr, but is one he does not want us to forget our sinful and prideful 
human tendencies. And further, he does not want us to forget a similar self-deception that 
could be multiplied in our collective life. 
 The basic problem of Niebuhr, which many have pointed out, is that he only 
emphasizing one dynamic of institutional life and his “social substance” of human life is 
still underdeveloped in these early formulations in Moral Man.  This is so, even though 
we can detect a strong interrelationship, albeit negative, between the individual and 
society in his critique of American individualism and the class-based hypocrisy of 
privilege.  This is certainly a statement about the social location of knowledge.  But 
before analyzing his movement to more fully appreciate, at least in his mind, the “social 
substance” of humans in his Man’s Nature and His Communities Book, I want to present 
two critiques that get at the heart of this problem and anticipate Niebuhr’s own 
“openings.”  
 
H. Richard Niebuhr and John Courtney Murray S.J. 
 H. Richard Niebuhr, just after the publishing of Moral Man suggested a similar 
criticism of his brother in a private letter that remained in the family archive and now 
presumably is in the Library of Congress archive.  In the letter he affirmed Reinhold’s 
critique of “idealist” positions that too easily place hope in reforming the nation by 
joining force with and perhaps giving up an independent critical voice over against, with 
new theories of human progress that will also create the new being.  H. Richard Niebuhr: 
 17 
“I have no defense of idealism to offer.  I hate it with all my heart as an expression of our 
original sin.”
19
  But, as biographer Richard Fox recounts, H. Richard did associate with 
some of Reinhold’s critics on at least several accounts.  Each of these seems to have at 
their base, a criticism of Reinhold’s insufficient faith in the message of his own Christian 
tradition. Fox lays out most of the contents of the letter, which were not made public at 
the time of Moral Man’s publication. The first criticism attacked Reinhold’s “defeatism.”  
Like him, his critics were “as cynical or almost as cynical and skeptical… but they have 
hope—not much but a little, and faith, not a great deal but some.”
20
   
They criticize you not for what you said but for what you could not say.  They 
await a Messianic word of release which has not been given to our time. You are 
so much of a Christian that you can understand and appreciate them…
21
 
 
According to Fox, what is behind this is H. Richard’s concern that Reinhold was not only 
not offering a messianic hope, but that it put the church in the same swim of  his negative 
view of collective life.  Fox suggests that H. Richard had an impact on Reinhold and next 
lectures and his “nature and destiny of man” project was an answer to his brother’s critic. 
Embracing theology was Reinhold’s way of countering the charge of 
defeatism…he had to show that there was a place for faith, a reason to hope, a 
role for the church.  He had to show that life did go “beyond tragedy,”—as 
Richard had argued in “The Grace of Doing Nothing”—and toward fulfillment.
22
 
 
 Without putting too many “revisionist” connections in H. Richard’s critique, it 
seems valid to assume that Reinhold’s defeatism could be rescued by suggesting that the 
church, as a collective body, had a role to play in the drama of social engagement.  H. 
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Richard was at least offering, though lightly, a different role for institutions and their role 
in positive change, and certainly for hope.  At a minimum the church could be a counter 
weight against injustice, just like was possible for individuals. In fact, H. Richard thought 
his brother was too “idealistic” about individuals: 
Therefore, I must dissent from the whole argument that “individuals (as 
individuals) have a moral code…which makes the actions of collective man an 
outrage to their conscience.”  They have a code which makes their own actions an 
outrage to their own conscience…
23
 
  
But H. Richard levels his most significant critique when he felt that his brother was too 
idealist about “religion.”  He charges him with a view of only speaking about 
“humanistic religion.”  Reinhold had not broken with “idealism” either in his view of the 
individual or religion, according to his brother: 
You think of religion as a power—dangerous sometimes, helpful sometimes.  
That’s liberal.  For religion itself is no power, but that to which religion is 
directed , God…I think the liberal religion is thoroughly bad.  It is a first-aid to 
hypocrisy.  It is the exaltation of goodwill, moral idealism.  It worships the God 
whose qualities are ‘the human qualities raised to the nth degree,”  and I don’t 
expect as much help from this religion as you do.  It is sentimental and 
romantic.
24
 
 
How else is an alternate worldview of the Christian faith sustained other than within the 
church?  Individuals in fact needed formation in institutions.  Certainly Christians need 
this in their community life in the church.  Though he did not say it exactly this way, H. 
Richard was pointing to a logic that was less dichotomous in the relationship between the 
collective and the individual.  Perhaps in the end, it was not that Reinhold did not have 
hope, according to H. Richard, it was that he had hope in the wrong and logically flawed 
view of the individual, the wrong view of religion and certainly an inadequate view of 
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collective life as a means of  “formation.”  As stated above, apparently Reinhold took 
these criticisms to heart.  However, if H. Richard fully understood Reinhold’s motivation 
and full agenda, is not clear by these comments.  Increasingly Reinhold was not just 
speaking to a Christian audience, he was speaking to modern man and society in general. 
 But it most likely that it also took Reinhold’s Catholic conversation partners to 
help expand his thinking on the individual’s social nature and institutional life as 
formation for individuals.  John Courtney Murray, Niebuhr’s counterpart as a public 
intellectual, though from the Catholic community, called the morality of Protestantism an 
“intramural argument.”  Biographer, Charles Brown indicated that Murray was “often 
engaged in dialogues with Niebuhr.” No doubt, without mentioning Niebuhr’s name in 
his book of 1960, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American 
Proposition, Murray was helping to deepen Niebuhr’s respect for the social substance of 
humans.  Through the tradition of natural law, Murray was making a more profound 
statement about individuals and their collective life.  A statement that we shall see is 
more in line with Bellah’s position.  Where H. Richard was asking for a hopeful role of 
the church, Murray was analyzing why Niebuhr and Protestant thought in the United 
States was caught in a series of arguments that they were incapable of escaping.  After 
exploring how the newer morality (presumably represented by Niebuhr) debunked the 
older morality (simplistic Protestant individualism), Murray concludes that the two 
moralities remained present to the extent that discussions were still within a framework 
that excluded many features of individual and collective life and therefore, had “many 
 20 
similarities.”  One similarity was “their common rejection of the whole style and 
structure of natural law morality, according to Murray.”
25
   
 Murray, analyzing this intramural argument in the realm of “morality and public 
policy,” identified three problems with this loss of natural law thinking in American 
moral thought: 1) the gulf between the individual and collective morality which leads to a 
position that all politics is Realpolitik (I will say more about this later); 2) the 
corresponding position that nation states can only operate on self-interest and again must 
jump headlong in to the mess with “eyes wide open” and; 3) the problem of power that 
leads to the notion “that to use power is to be ‘irresponsible,’ and therefore [when you 
use it] to be more guilty yet.”
26
  Without going into all facets of Murray’s argument, he 
makes a case for why he, a Catholic natural law thinker, needs to enter the moral debate.  
He admits he has difficulty in figuring out what “all the shouting is about” in this internal 
Protestant debate.  There are three issues that seem to him to be “factitious,” and 
“pseudo-problems.”  He takes each of the issues and reads them from a Catholic natural 
law tradition.  We will take the first one to illustrate his critique: 
The Protestant moralist is disturbed by the gulf between the morality of the 
individual and collective man.  He is forever trying somehow to close the gap.  
Forever he fails, not only in doing this but even in seeing how it could possibly be 
done. Thus, he is driven back upon the simplest category of “ambiguity.” Or he 
sadly admits and unresolvable dichotomy between moral man and immoral 
society. [Italics Added]
27
 
 
It is hard not to see this as at least a partial reference to Niebuhr in this statement.  
Murray sees this irresolvable dichotomy to be the consequence of a “defective theory.”  
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This is so, for this theory fails to see society as a “natural institution with [its] relatively 
autonomous ends or purposes, which are predesigned in broad outline in the social and 
political nature of man.”
28
  He goes on to say, “morality proper to the life and action of 
society and the state is not univocally the morality of personal life, or even familial life.”  
It remains to be assessed whether this critique does justice to Niebuhr’s mature thought or 
it was truer of the Niebuhr of Moral Man.  I am inclined to think that Niebuhr could 
never go this far with natural law thinking, particularly in regards to a full theory of 
institutional life as having its own unique moral contribution to make and not to be 
judged only in terms of individual morality.   
 H. Richard Niebuhr, suggested that his brother was too idealistic about the 
individual and his appeal to a “humanistic religion” and pointed him in the direction of a 
more hopeful stance based on his Christian faith and ecclesiology.  Murray, appears to 
have suggested that Reinhold was still trying to operate with a private morality as his 
standard and only trying to be realistic about the limits of this private ethic as it 
manifested itself in collective life. And Niebuhr’s view of collective life was no more 
than a collection of individuals.  In both cases, H. Richard and Murray are indicating that 
Reinhold’s view of collective life was colored by both an over emphasis on the individual 
and an incomplete appreciation of the moral possibilities in collective life.  In the end, or 
at least early on, Neibuhr was not able to shake a latent view of the individual as only an 
“autonomous self.”   If they were right, and I think they were to a large extent, this was, 
again, ironic given of his critique of a self-reliant American individualism.  And  perhaps 
even more ironic given his critique of the social location of privilege.  Clearly there was a 
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strong social dimension to his thought, it was still underdeveloped until late in his life.  
There were openings however. 
 
Openings: Man’s Nature and His Communities 
 If we can assume that Man’s Nature and His Communities that was published in 
1965 was, in a sense, a response to some of these criticisms,  a shift does occur in 
Niebuhr’s, social nature of man.  The most clear statement of this is in his final chapter 
“Man’s Selfhood in its Self-Seeking and Self-Giving.” It is his focus on his concept of 
“common grace,” that heightens his notion of the “social substance of individuals” which 
he announced in the book’s Introduction. This was one of his “perspectives” that he 
changed.   How big of  a change was it?  Niebuhr, drawing on “modern psychiatry,” 
particularly the work of Erick Erickson, and the biblical insight of  “He who finds his life 
will lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it,”  to make his point.  He 
interprets this insight as a paradox: “consistent self-seeking is bound to be self-defeating; 
on the other hand, self-giving is bound to contribute ultimately to self-realization.”  He 
sees the community of the family, the “most primordial of all human communities,” 
where this paradoxical dynamic can best be nurtured, where the self, freed of undue self-
concern, is able to relate itself to others.”
29
   He says it best in his own words: 
Thus the gift of security given by parents to children is transmuted naturally into 
the ability of even those parents, who are otherwise self-seeking, to be “self-
giving” in their relations to their family.  Thus modern psychiatry has validated 
and given new emphasis to what was defined in orthodox religious thought as 
“common grace.” [Italics Added]
30
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Again we see how Niebuhr’s Christian vision and theology for him is reinforced with 
what can be discovered to be validated in other disciplines and empirical study.  But 
continuing on the social substance of individuals journey, Niebuhr makes clear that the 
family is not the only community through which the “self is made secure and in turn is 
offered the opportunity of self-fulfillment through self-giving.” 
These other communities, not only include various civic communities from tribe 
to city-state, to empire and nation.  They also include all communities of culture 
which engage creatively the reason and imagination of the self, thus leading to 
self-realization by the fulfillment of all its talents.
31
 
 
 These statements clearly move beyond a mere isolated individual with a moral 
will.  This will is conditioned by grace, which flows from the nurturing community.  This 
is also closer to the  more embedded individual of Murray and has hints of a theory of  
institutions articulated by Bellah, which I will elaborate below.  It is certainly more 
Christian in his ethic and is developing a stronger role for religious communities.  He 
completes this thought by suggesting that Erick Erikson’s concept of “basic trust” in his 
book, Childhood and Society, indicates that it is  “the abundance of security as furnished 
by the love and devotion which others gives the self” as what completes the circle of the 
paradox: consistent self-seeking is self-defeating; but self-giving is impossible to the self 
without resources furnished by the family.
32
 
 After demonstrating that “modern empirical studies support the paradox of Jesus,” 
Niebuhr then elaborates on his concept of “common grace,” and its use in the Christian 
tradition.  This is where Niebuhr’s critique of Protestantism is addressed, exhibiting a 
familiarity if not agreement with the resources of Catholic thought.  It is also where he 
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addresses more fully the positive role of the “communities of faith.”  Maybe this is not 
the full statement of an ecclesiology for Niebuhr, but it certainly helps to give H. Richard  
a sense that his brother continues to answer his challenge.   
 He begins by analyzing the confusions in orthodox doctrine, both Catholic and 
Reformation.  He suggests that the distinction between saving grace and common grace 
only makes sense if saving grace as it exists within the conscience of the individual (and 
in its more complete theoretical formulation), frees that individual from devotion to a 
“contingent” community, such as family, race or nation, to “ultimate loyalty to God.”  
Because this has not been the history of the church in practice, it has lead to an 
“idolatrous” worship of the immediate community whether it is the family, church or 
nation.  The well being of other communities become difficult, and the  common welfare 
or common good is shortchanged.
33
  Neibuhr, particularly traces this dynamic in the life 
of the historic church.  From his perspective the church should be a humble community, 
for it is a community of  “saved individuals, who know themselves to be “forgiven 
sinners.”  The actual fact has most often been the opposite, though he acknowledges the 
Christian Church does not have a monopoly on a lack of humility.  But his audience in 
this chapter is largely the church: 
Historically speaking, religious piety is more apt to be found claiming the divine 
for an ally of its own partial view-points—It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and 
to us”—rather than showing a humble awareness of the relative aspects of all 
historical loyalties or as bringing for the  fruits of repentance for shortcomings as 
judged by the transcendent God.
34
  
 
This tendency in Christian piety is redeemed by dissident individuals and the prophet, a 
role Niebuhr often played in foreign policy circles.  He still has his high hopes for 
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individual morality, even though he now sees it to be more complicated than in Moral 
Man, which we will see below. 
 A second confusion in the paradox of self-giving and self-striving that Niebuhr 
saw in  ascetic Catholicism, and Protestant moralism and perfectionist sects, was “self-
righteousness” and “perfectionism.”  The consequence of this led to seeing that “all forms 
of self- regard and self-realization” are sinful and thus obscuring the truth in Jesus’ 
original paradox of self-giving . (This is a departure in emphasis if not substance from his 
last chapter in Moral Man, where self-regard is his chief concern for morality.) 
According to Niebuhr an emphasis was put on “saving grace” as a way to rescue the self 
from undue destruction.  This led to a striving for a “divine grace” at the expense of the 
“unconscious grace” of common experience that he saw in parental love.  Further, this 
striving lead to a “saving grace” mediated by “the church and consciously sought by the 
believer.”  Eventually this became too much of a focus on “salvation through right 
belief.”
35
   
This made the religious conception of grace even more confusing than the ascetic 
effort to rid the self of egoism through moral striving. Yet it must be recognized 
that there are certain elements of truth in the concept of saving grace.  Those 
elements of truth are revealed in genuine evangelical experience in which he self 
apprehends a larger system of loyalty and meaning than he common loyalties and 
commitments which are the stuff of common grace.[Italics Added]
36
 
 
Niebuhr goes on to further explain his concept of common grace. It is in the social life of 
man that he experiences this.  It is clear that he wants to distance himself from certain 
forms of collective life that do not produce common grace.  The social life of man can 
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“obviously be both the source of common grace and of demonic evil.”  To illustrate this, 
which is a reformulation of his collective evil argument, he refers to the Nazism. But he 
then develops a complicated argument where he traces the difficulty to sustain the 
paradox of Jesus in the life of  American Protestantism.  Looking closely at this 
argument, which closes the book, helps to understand just how far Niebuhr’s thought 
evolved.  He contends that the Great Awakening of Jonathan Edwards and the revivals in 
Ohio under Finney, were examples of where the creative impulse of religion were fruitful 
“not only for the individuals but for the community.” In the case of Finney, he sees the 
anti-slavery movement as a “common grace” impulse.  “Impulse” is the operative word, 
for Niebuhr, it “did not affect seriously the institution of slavery. 
The failure of Protestant Evangelicalism to challenge the institution of slavery 
…may not be due to its specific weakness but to the general failure of any 
religious impulse to change radically a social climate of any culture…But there 
were specific weaknesses in Evangelicalism…among them were its individualism 
and its perfectionism.  Both of them were the fruits of an undue distinction 
between “saving grace” and “common grace.”  For this distinction exalts 
individual experience above social experience and thus obscures the social factors 
which redeem the individual from undue self-concern on the one hand, and those 
factors on the other hand which prevent him form regarding his own life 
critically.
37
  
 
“Social factors which redeem,” are really “institutions” that can have a positive and 
negative influence.  This is certainly a shift in emphasis for Niebuhr. But for this analysis, 
however, he turns his criticism to  the church. With its emphasis on a community that is 
too set apart by its focus on “saving grace,” it is unable to engage in the messy 
(ambiguous) world of life in terms other than individualism and perfectionism.  This 
“isolation” (my word) has not allowed the church to fully appreciate its own imperfection 
and also contribute to a healthier “social situation.”   
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It may help, but not too much, to gather these saved individuals into a community 
of  “forgiven sinners” and to insist on higher moral standards in this select 
community than in the whole society.  But the evidence of the relation of 
Christian congregations to their general communities rather points to the fact that 
the religious community, whether evangelical or conventional, may have higher 
standards when there is an uncomplicated relation between the religious impulse 
and the fidelity of moral life, whether in marriage or in business enterprises.
38
  
 
After this argument about the weakness of Evangelical Protestantism and particularly its 
institutionalization in the church as he saw it, he ends with: 
But all these complexities also reveal that the distinction between saving grace 
and common grace has been too much emphasized by he religious communities.  
This emphasis has obscured the true situation of the human self, has made for 
religious self-righteousness, for a meticulous rather than generous moral ethos, 
and has prevented any truth about love, grace and law from being generally 
understood or practiced.
39
 
 
 Whether you accept his argument, at least as a partial description much of the 
Protestant culture, it is important to see key openings in his thought.  First, social forces 
can be positive factors, but more important there is a sense that institutions have a voice 
in these arguments.  It may not always be a healthy voice, but it is present.  We are not 
just talking about a lone individual, yet his role for the individual is still important, and 
may be, in the end the most crucial.  Second, religious sentiment or “impulse’ is creative, 
yet still not sufficient in the messy play of social forces.  Third, “common grace” for 
Niebuhr becomes the shorthand for Niebuhr to say that responsible action in the “web of 
pressures and counter pressures” of life is what is what makes him confident about his 
social Christianity.  Common grace is an illustration that the self can be transformed in 
these “forms of social security or responsibility or pressure which prompt the self to 
bethink itself of its social essence and to realize itself by not trying too desperately for 
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self-realization” (saving grace)
40
    Fourth, his criticism of the church is not to despair of 
the church but to call the church to its own self realization by working on common grace 
and the right theory of saving grace.  Niebuhr has pushed the edges of his own thinking.  
Major breakthroughs from Moral Man have occurred.  His view of a social nature of 
humans seems secure, even as he continues to maintain the important role for prophetic 
witness. His institutional analysis is less developed but his focus on the church has 
expanded.  Whether he answered all the criticisms of H. Richard and John Courtney 
Murray is uncertain.  Were has Bellah expanded our thinking on these subjects? 
 
Robert Bellah: Habits of the Heart and The Good Society 
 Bellah’s view of the individual and his view of the role of institutions avoids the 
major error that Murray identified as the problem of Protestant moral thought, the 
unbridgeable gap between the individual and society.  Drawing on a more Catholic view 
of the embedded individual, an understanding of the character forming nature of 
institutions and a critique of Protestant dialectical thinking with a more catholic 
analogical thinking, Bellah forges a different approach to morality in the public sphere. 
This is an approach that maintains a strong Christian anthropology that is in line with 
much of Niebuhr’s prophetic individual but avoids the sense that collective life has to be 
more ethically problematic (ambiguous) than individual life. For Bellah they are both 
problematic and both ethically capable.  Whether Bellah goes as far as Murray to ascribe 
the same type of “natural” moral parameters on institutions such as societies and nations 
is open to study. But Bellah’s institutional and collective sympathies are more with 
Murray and H. Richard Niebuhr. And they are certainly more in line with Reinhold’s 
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“common grace” and his categorical statement in Man’s Nature: “the self needs other 
selves in order to be itself.”  Therefore, it is appropriate that the two Niebuhrs and 
Murray are to be seen as building blocks (conversation partners) for a continuous social 
Christianity that Bellah wants to energize in American social and religious thinking.  I 
think Bellah would like to see his work as deepening their insights rather than 
illustrating
41
 his greater wisdom. In general Bellah is rather irenic in his treatment of 
Niebuhr.  No doubt Bellah’s legacy and  continuity with Christian Realism will be the 
willingness of others to work to deepen his thought as his has done with Niebuhr. 
 Individualism is under attack in every one of Bellah’s writings.  His systematic 
treatment of the American problem is found in Habits of the Heart that anticipates his 
Good Society book, which extends the analysis in terms of the institutional arrangements, 
and mores that contribute to the “unrealistic Lockean individualism” of American society 
and market driven societies in general.  This analysis continues to be unrelenting and 
penetrating in The Robert Bellah Reader and his many lectures and sermons.  The source 
of this attack is both his normative Christian view of the world and his analysis of what 
has become a self-defeating and contradictory life style of modern societies and 
particularly in the United States.  His normative view is expressed in his sermons but 
increasingly is intentionally present in his social science books.  In Habits of the Heart 
when commenting on the “poverty of affluence” of our modern era where our “common 
life requires more than an exclusive concern for material accumulation,” he asks us to 
remember “we did not create ourselves.” One way to remember this is through “common 
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worship” where in the face of “the mystery of being itself” we may be able to “remember 
what we, in our individualism and self sufficiency,” would like to forget: 
…we owe what we are to the communities that formed us, and to what Paul 
Tillich called ‘the structure of grace in history’ that made communities possible.  
We will need to see the story of our life on earth not as an unbroken success but 
as a history of suffering as well as joy.  We will need to remember the millions of 
suffering people in the word today and the millions whose suffering in the past 
made our present affluence possible.
42
 
 
We see in this statement elements of what Lovin and Sims referred to as a hope and 
confidence, in spite of a realistic assessment of the world.  We also see Murray’s notion 
of the naturalness of collective life.  We particularly see that Bellah’s individual is not the 
lone autonomous individual.  For Bellah, the individual is only that which is formed in 
community.  There is not abstract individual. He sees this from his Christian view of the 
world and from his analysis of human existence in modernity and throughout human 
history.  Before we turn to his sociological analysis, one more statement about the 
resources for his “social understanding of human beings.”   
 In the Good Society Bellah once again indicates his agreement with the Catholic 
tradition and its formulation of the individual. In the same section, Bellah first quotes 
from Walter Lippman on the same point. “We are in truth members of one another, and a 
philosophy which seek to differentiate the community from the persons who belong to it, 
treating them as if they were distinct sovereignties having only diplomatic relations is 
contrary to fact and can lead only to moral bewilderment.”
43
  If  Niebuhr acknowledges in 
Man’s Nature in 1965 that he is beginning to take more seriously the Catholic social 
substance of humans, it is clear that this is at the core of Bellah’s theology, ethics and 
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politics.  Quoting from the American Catholic Bishop’s Pastoral Letter on the US 
Economy, which he often does, he states: 
As an example of fresh thinking about our situation, we call to mind the American 
Catholic bishops’ 1986 letter on the U.S. economy, which argued eloquently that 
the dignity of the human person provides the moral cornerstone for social and 
economic life.  But for the bishops the human person is not an abstract individual 
but one whose dignity is realized only in community. The commandments to love 
God with all one’s heart and to love one’s neighbor as oneself lay the foundations 
of human community. All persons have rights, but they arise from a mutual bond 
to care for one another as members of one creation and are rooted in “reverence 
for God as creator and fidelity to the covenant.” [Italics Added]
44
 
 
Bellah adds, more from the voice of a social scientist, yet rooted in the above vision: 
“Justice begins with recognition of the need of all persons to take part in the life of a 
community in order to be fully human, by being united with one another in mutual 
activity and, finally, mutual love.
45
 
 
Bellah’s ongoing struggle to find the key out of Weber’s “iron cage” of the 
Protestant ethic that has turned back on itself, continues to rely on the Catholic tradition.  
It is here that he agrees with David Tracy’s assessment in his book Analogical 
Imagination
46
  that Christian theological tradition has included both analogy and 
dialectic. Suggesting that he is oversimplifying Tracy, he sees the analogical imagination 
as focusing on “similarities in the relationship between God, self, society, and world,” 
and the dialectical imagination focuses on “dissimilarities.”  In a chapter in The Robert 
Bellah Reader entitled, “On Being Catholic in America,” where Tracy sees the need for 
both, Bellah for the moment, is content to point out that the “imagination of Protestantism 
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has become dangerously one-sided.”
47
  Lovin aptly states where Niebuhr’s method 
resides. He says that Niebuhr’s “method is dialectical, in the sense that concepts are 
clarified by stating what they exclude, and positions are explained by specifying what 
they reject.”
48
  Again after acknowledging Tracy as seeing dialectics as a corrective on 
the analogical imagination, Bellah sees the consequences of the Protestant overemphasis 
on negative dialectics: 
…Protestants have emphasized the element of critical judgment, the great 
negations of the prophetic tradition, at the expense of the affirmations of Being, 
the capacity to accept the world as God’s creation.  The critical dialectical 
moment, which is certainly there at the heart of the tradition, has become 
unhinged from the other core elements of the tradition, and the result, for good 
and for ill is the drastic progress of modernity.
49
 
 
Elsewhere Bellah has bemoaned that the state of our intellectual life that has been 
overwhelmed by a post-modern focus on a hermeneutic of suspicion and deconstruction, 
particularly one that devalues tradition.  In fact Lovin points out that Niebuhr helped 
introduce “into the discourse of American religious and social ethics what a later 
generation would call the “hermeneutics of suspicion.”
50
  In Good Society Bellah asks for 
a “hermeneutic of recovery, through which we can understand what a living tradition is in 
the first place.” The other consequences of this unhinged Christian tradition are 1)a weak 
doctrine of the Trinity, with an low Christology, 2) emphasis on the Word of judgment at 
the expense of the Sacrament, and 3) a low ecclesiology with an emphasis on no 
mediation between and the individual and radically transcendent God. 
 It is clear that Bellah is affirming much of an “orthodox” Christianity.  The 
tradition is meaningful to him.  Again, one can see his own faith as a Christian present in 
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these words. But perhaps just important is his confidence in his social science that seeks  
for ways to understand our hope for a fuller humanity.  A fruitful line of inquiry for 
understanding Bellah is to explore the relation of these insights to his long held view of  
“religious evolution.”  In his current projected two-volume work on the subject, 
unpublished manuscripts reveal his confidence that “nothing is lost.”  Bellah understands 
the axial breakthroughs that contribute to the “critical dimension” of modernity;  he also 
uses the terms “theoretic” or “conceptual” to define our modern age.  He maintains that 
previous periods of human history were no less religious.  These periods were 
characterized by mimetic (ritual) and mythic (narrative) cultures.  These cultures are still 
with us.  Even the theoretic culture, which grows out of and significantly criticizes the 
past, never abandons, the early stages.
51
 This line of inquiry will be developed in a future 
work.  But back to Bellah’s use of the Catholic tradition. 
 Bellah has certainly engaged in dialectics but he is also at home in the analogical 
imagination.  At the close of his chapter “On being Catholic and American,” after he 
defends the important role his quintessential Catholic intellectuals, Charles Taylor and 
Alasdair MacIntyre could play in an academy less tied to disciplines, he states: 
I suspect a closer look at the actual practices going on in the various fields, 
including the natural sciences, might yield more analogies than we might expect.  
A process of mutual self-interrogation might bring some greater understanding of 
the relationship of the parts to the whole. [Italics Added]
52
 
 
The similarity of this conviction to Niebuhr’s confidence in the validation of his Christian 
worldview with empirical science is noteworthy.  In one of his most analogically 
imaginative essays in the Bellah Reader, “Flaws in the Protestant Code: Theological 
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Roots of American Individualism,” Bellah uses an analogy from genetics.  He begins 
with a passage from Clifford Geertz, “Culture patterns [are] sources of information that—
like genes—provide a blueprint of template in terms of which processes external to 
themselves can be given a definite form.”
53
  To make his case he cites the work of David 
Voegel
54
 where he analyzes why certain cultures have a stronger environmental 
movement. He discovered that Protestant cultures seem to have stronger commitment to 
environmentalism. Vogel suggest one of the reasons for this connection: it is the sense of 
mastery over the environment.  As Vogel states: “if one believes that control or mastery 
of the world is possible, one can just as readily choose to treat it well as dominate it. In 
any event, it is the people who are ultimately responsible for nature.”
55
 
 The point of using Vogel’s argument is to suggest that even though Protestant 
cultures have been successful in many ways, we now see a watershed in this success, 
according to Bellah: 
Now you will see the fiendish twist that I will give to the idea of a deep cultural 
code.  Just as a genetic code can produce a highly successful species…perhaps at 
the moment of greatest success…the code can lead to rapid extinction… [and] can 
lead a civilization into abrupt decline if it disables it form solving central 
problems , perhaps problems created by its own success.
56
 
 
After, enumerating some of these “central problems” such as “porous institutions” and 
surface prosperity,” he reminds us that however deep, a culture code is not a genetic 
code, it can changed. In this essay he focuses on the depletions of our social capital and 
suggests the need for reinvigorated voluntary associations and a fuller ecclesiology that 
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includes a sacramental dimension as away to address these depletions.  In this essay he is 
exhibiting much of his Good Society solution to address the flaws of individualism and a 
depletion of our institutional life.   But one final comment about Bellah’s assessment of 
the individual in this modern Protestant culture.  He is clear that the reality of a depleted 
institutional life creates a depleted individual.  Drawing often on his co-author, Ann 
Swidler’s article, “Saving the Self, Endowment versus Depletion in American 
Institutions,”
57
 he suggests that the individual is now depleted as well.  In a recent lecture 
he states: 
We live in a society obsessed with the self—above all most of us want to be rich, 
powerful, beautiful, and admired, or at least one of the above, and I certainly can’t 
claim to be an exception.  But instead of saying we are too obsessed with the self 
perhaps we should say we are not obsessed enough, we haven’ looked deeply 
enough into what we want, which is the just self, capable of treating other justly 
in the context of a just society.
58
 
 
Perhaps we are getting close to what Niebuhr referred to as “common grace,”  and maybe 
the paradox of Jesus on loosing yourself to gain yourself.  For Bellah, how does this “just 
self’ get nurtured?  Because “selves do not exist in isolation, it is hard to be a good self in 
a bad society, according to Bellah.”
59
  What is the solution for this situation for Bellah? 
 Again his social analysis and his theological hope come together in his view of 
institutions.  If Habits pointed the way to a reform of institutional life, The Good Society 
is his deep exploration of what kind of institutional reform is needed to help our depleted 
self and our depleted social life.   Simply put, if institutions help form individuals, we 
need a “good society.” Bellah says, if we have a vicious society we will not have good 
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people.  Working from a framework of Catholic social teachings about individuals in 
community and building on his grounding in Talcott Parsons’ view of institutions, Bellah 
has developed a theory of institutions (and organizational life) that is missing in Niebuhr, 
but present in Murray and other social/cultural scientists such as Mary Douglas.  But he 
goes beyond Parsons in what he and his co-authors call their normative and analytical 
approach. These are the theoretical underpinnings to Good Society that are outlined 
especially in the Introduction entitled, “We Live Through Institutions,” written in 1991:  
In Habits of the Heart we asked, “How ought we to live? How do we think about 
how to live?” and we focused on cultural and personal resources for thinking 
about our common life.  In Good Society we are concerned with the same 
questions, but are now focusing on the patterned ways Americans have developed 
for living together, what sociologists call institutions.
60
 
 
After analyzing why Americans in our Protestant culture have difficulty with institutions 
because we see ourselves as “self-created atoms manipulating or being manipulated by 
objective institutions,” Bellah states that: “we form institutions and institutions form us 
every time we engage in a conversation that matters, and certainly every time we act as 
parent child, student or teacher, citizen or official, in each case calling on models and 
metaphors for the rightness or wrongness of action.”  For Bellah, institutions are both 
constraining and enabling.”
61
  
They are the substantial forms through which we understand our own identity and 
the identity of others as we seek cooperatively to achieve a decent society. The 
idea that institutions are objective mechanisms that are essentially separate from 
the lives of individuals who inhabit them is an ideology that exacts a high moral 
and political price.
62
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Building on Mary Douglas when she states, “responsibility is something we exercise as 
individuals but within and on behalf of institutions,”
63
 the Good Society book is a call to 
action for a just society, a good society,  
 
 The key institutions treated in the book are the political economy, government, 
law and politics, education, and the public church.  In each case the co-authors assess 
what kind of individual is being formed in the inherited institutions? What kind of 
patterns of meaning are they communicating to us? And how do we change the 
institutions to focus more on the well being of a fuller notion of who we are as social 
beings?  Certainly The Good Society is a book about our responsibility in helping to 
create a “good society.”  It is the “idealist” Bellah that emerges as the new “realist.”  The 
emphasis is not just on the complication of transforming institutions or society that 
Neibuhr would stress, but it is an analysis on how to transform these institutions and a 
conviction that this can be done, for it needs to be done.  What is at stake is a cultural 
catastrophe of our own making.   
  It is here that we see more clearly the shift from Niebuhr to Bellah. This is a shift 
that continues to carry the realist tradition into a new era, with the grounding in a 
theological hope and confidence.  
 
III. Idealism and Realism 
Reinhold Niebuhr: Moral Man and Immoral Society 
 Separately analyzing the themes of the “individual and society” and “idealism and 
realism” has been largely for analytical convenience to help draw attention to key 
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distinctions for the sake of comparing the thought of others’ with that of Niebuhr’s.  For 
Niebuhr, particularly in Moral Man, the key issue for him in challenging the idealists was 
their inability to understand that you could not move from individual morality and expect 
to see this translate into the how individuals perform when they are collected in groups.  
This led him to challenge the idealism of the social gospel movement that, for him, 
among other mistakes, made this sift too easily.  It also led him to challenge the pacifists 
who failed to see that in the realm of politics, especially nation states, violence therefore, 
war could be used as a neutral moral instrument.  Further in Moral Man he criticized 
liberals for failing to see that in politics you could not just educate and morally persuade 
people to give up their privilege. All of this was his early entry into creating a new 
current in the waters of social Christianity, were he remained. 
 Niebuhr, largely based this critique on several elements, which remained strong in 
all his thought.  First, he used his Marxist critique of entrenched self-interest in the 
privileged class.  Second, what he considered his Christian anthropology about the role of 
evil and its root in individuals, and especially groups. And the differential role that reason 
and religious imagination plays in each.  In Moral Man this was how he understood the 
differential capacity of individuals and groups to use reason and their creative 
imaginative side to move beyond self-regard to a public good (not his word).  This led 
him to be “realistic” about the ethic of each.  Individuals could occasionally break 
through and exhibit love.  However, social groups, especially politics could only hope for 
a break through for justice.  His concept of justice was a limited one based on his realism.  
It took competing power to stabilize collective life.  He held out for certain movements to 
“break through” with idealist thinking to create change.  Again tied to his historical 
 39 
context in Moral Man, he judged this breakthrough to be positive or negative.  Looking at 
the international proletariat, he could see some potential for positive change, but it too 
would only institute an incomplete justice.  Eventually he would be able to analyze 
communism as an idealistic messianic pseudo religion that would not produce positive 
change.  
 In Moral Man he was also tied to the inescapable reality of national identity.  For 
him this was the most defining identity for human groups in the early 20
th
 century.  This 
judgment did not change much throughout his life.  I will address this below when 
discussing the openings in his “realism.”  In one of the most instructive and perhaps, 
most painful chapters to read in Moral Man is his chapter on the “morality of nations.”  It 
is instructive for it makes a strong empirical case for the “reality” that national self-
interest, in it most narrow sense has too many historical examples to be ignored.  It is 
painful for this “reality” is still too close to home with our present world situation.  As is 
the case throughout Moral Man, there are “exceptional” moments when a group, in this 
case a nation, might act less out of self-regard and for “justice.’  Niebuhr defines 
moments when the British government achieves this status. 
 Just in case his readers are not confused as to what his “realism” is based on in 
Moral Man, Niebuhr concludes with a chapter entitled, “Individual and Social Morality.”  
He begins by reiterating that the highest ideal of society is justice and the highest ideal of 
the individual is unselfishness.   
Society must strive for justice even if it is forced to use means, such as self-
assertion, resistance, coercion and perhaps resentment, which cannot gain the 
moral sanction of the most sensitive moral spirit.  The individual must strive to 
realize his life by losing and finding himself in something greater than himself.
64
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He then goes on to nuance this as to what he has just said.  The “two perspectives are not 
mutually exclusive and the contradiction is not absolute.”  He then summarizes his 
argument that he presented in his chapter on “Moral Values in Politics,”  where he admits 
that this contradiction can be “harmonized,” but not very easily.  
It was revealed that the highest moral insights and achievements of the individual 
conscience are both relevant and necessary to the life of society.  The most perfect 
justice cannot be established if the moral imagination of the individual does not 
seek to comprehend the needs and interests of his fellows.  Nor can any non-
rational instrument of justice be used without great peril to society, if it is not 
brought under the control of moral goodwill.  Any justice which is only justice 
soon degenerates into something less than justice.  It must be saved by something 
that is more than justice. [Italics Added]
65
  
 
“Any justice which is only justice soon degenerates into something less than justice.”  
This statement confounded me  when I first read it in the 1970’s.  My marginal notation 
was just a bunch of ?????.  I think reading it from the lens of the 60’s and 70’s 
“idealistic” radical movements that defined our age, I reconciled this statement with my 
sense that the old forms of liberal justice were not defining.  We were in fact ushering in 
a new more perfect justice. In this sense we could count Niebuhr on our side. (In 
hindsight this was a misreading.)  Niebuhr follows this up with: 
The realistic wisdom of the statesman is reduced to foolishness if it is not under 
the foolishness of the moral seer.  The latter’s idealism results in political futility 
and sometimes moral confusion, if not brought into commerce and 
communication with the realities of man’s collective life.
66
 
 
Then Niebuhr alludes to what I want to analyze more below that may connect with 
Bellah’s brand of “realism.”  He refers to this “harmonizing”  as a “necessity.”  This 
sentiment also seems to be present in his comment that “justice (with, at least, the “aim to 
seek equality for all of life”) which is only justice soon degenerates in to something less 
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than justice.” There is, in a sense, a new realism that we must attend to, even if latent and 
under emphasized in Niebuhr’s theory. 
This necessity and possibility of fusing moral and political insights does not, 
however, completely eliminate certain irreconcilable elements in the two types of 
morality, internal and external, individual and social.  These elements make for 
constant confusion but they also add to the richness of life. [Italics Added]
67
  
 
What to make of these comments? There are many places in Moral Man that  Niebuhr is 
most insistent that his realism is based on the need to maintain the split between private 
and public morality; but then he is quick to add the possibility of the creative 
breakthrough in group existence.  Yes it is still most often provided by the individual, 
who has the capacity not only justice but for love.  Yes it is always more difficult in 
groups.  But it never goes away and in fact it is even a “necessity.”  So there appears to 
be  another kind of “realism” in Niebuhr’s early work, though a nascent new realism.  
However, it is still an autonomous individual providing the most likelihood for 
manifesting its possibility in the life of groups.  Collectives still have the capacity, but for 
Niebuhr, at this stage it is such a long shot.  My sense, this is really Niebuhr’s sense of 
“confidence” breaking through.  It is what sustains his own individual action in groups 
and motivates him to be hopeful in “generation we are therefore bound to feel harassed as 
well disillusioned.”
68
  
 The last two paragraphs in Moral Man are certainly celebration quotes for the 75
th
 
anniversary of Moral Man and Immoral Society.  Here is the very last one: 
In the task of that redemption [of the total human enterprise] the most effective 
agents will be men who have substituted some new illusions for the abandoned 
ones.  The most important of these illusions is that the collective life of mankind 
can achieve perfect justice.  It is a very valuable illusion for the moment; for 
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justice cannot be approximated if the hope of its perfect realization does not 
generate sublime madness in the soul.  Nothing but such madness will do battle 
with malignant power and “spiritual wickedness in high places.” The illusion is 
dangerous because it encourages terrible fanaticisms.  It must therefore be brought 
under the control of reason.  One can only hope that reason will not destroy it 
before its work is done.
69
 
 
H. Richard. Niebuhr and John Courtney Murray S.J. 
 The critiques of Reinhold’s brother and no doubt the Jesuit Murray, played a role 
in where Niebuhr ended up with his last book, Man’s Nature and His Communities as I 
suggested above.  Most of this book is devoted to a systematic review of  “Idealism and 
Realism.”  H. Richard, as stated in the previous section on “the individual and society,” 
focuses on where Reinhold may have gotten his critique of idealism only partially right.  
Reinhold failed to see his own idealism in his view of the individual and his use of 
humanistic religion. There is no need to repeat his arguments here.  Murray on the other 
hand, continued to hammer away at not only at the strange brand of Protestantism that 
focuses on autonomous individuals but also on autonomous collectives also acting like 
individuals (or more correct, not capable of acting like individuals).  This false theory, for 
him, led to an ethics of “ambiguity” and “paradox” as the way out of the unbridgeable 
gulf between individuals and society.  But Murray developed a more profound and 
complete theory of institutional life.  If understood, it could have helped Niebuhr better 
understand how institutional life could contribute to the moral life of societies, in 
Bellah’s terms, a good society.  From Murray’s point of view this would have helped 
Protestant moralists, such as Niebuhr, avoid an over emphasis on the realism of self-
interested politics. 
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 Murray analyses the bind that Protestant’s often find themselves in moral and 
political thought to lead them to compress “the moral life of man into one dimension”
70
 
the moral dimension of “ambiguity.”  Murray states: 
The ambiguist, indicts the fundamentalist and the secular liberal for their one-
dimensional views of man. But he does not recognize that the same indictment 
recoils on his head. He easily disposes of all the utopians, both “hard” and “soft,” 
that result from one-dimensional the one dimensional fundamentalist and secular 
liberal views…He who relishes irony should relish this—that the whole 
complicated argument against simplistic theories should result in the creation of a 
theory that is itself simplistic; that the smashing attack on the bright and brittle 
illusion of utopianism should win its victory under the banner of an opposite 
illusion that is marshy and murky but no less an illusion.
71
 
 
Murray, in this regard would put Niebuhr in the category of the ambiguists. Without 
going into Murray’s complete argument, we can appreciate it in its broad outlines.  If the 
private morality of individuals is the standard for morality and this private morality can 
never be the realized standard for collective life, then what one is left with is a plunge 
into political life.  This is a necessary plunge, in fact mandated by our faith.  But this is a 
plunge with only the expectations of complexity and a war of competing self-interests.  
This is certainly an ambiguous effort.  We will now turn to Niebuhr’s book in 1965 to see 
if these criticisms had an influence on him.  As we indicated above, some of this 
argument influenced his view of collective grace.  Yet the themes of paradox and messy 
politics are very present. 
 
Openings: Man’s Nature and His Communities 
 This book illustrates how in his lifetime his experience with the recalibration of 
capitalism through what he refers to as “open societies,” had adjusted his early Marxist 
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views of “bourgeois society” (he still uses this term in 1965).   Still very much in the 
midst of the “cold war” of which he had an impact on helping to formulate American 
policy, and maybe to an extent because of this fact, Man’s Nature is consistent with his 
concern for collective egoism as mentioned above.  But it is in Man’s Nature that we find 
the softest edges of his old realism.  In fact at one point after tracing the various “realist” 
and “idealist” theories throughout Western thought he refers to his position as “moderate 
realism.”   What is moderate realism for Niebuhr and how does it connect with the need 
for realism today. 
 Early in the book he states very boldly his assumption of about the basis of 
“Christian realism.”  “In principle, the Christian faith holds that human nature contains 
both self-regarding and social impulses and that the former is stronger than the latter.” 
72
  
We now see a more prominent focus on the “social impulses as part of his formulation.  
But as usual he wants to remind us that the “virtue” in this “realistic analysis of the 
human condition does not guaranteed a Christian solution.”  And this is so for the very 
same reasons as he has maintained all along, for “two vexing problems”: 
The establishment of a tolerable harmony between self-regarding individuals 
within the civil community, and the relations of integral political communities 
with each other.  The second problem is naturally more difficult than the first 
because of the strength of collective self-regard in comparison with the self-
regard of individuals. [Italics Added]
73
  
 
Where are the soft edges in this statement?  It is instructive to read how Niebuhr 
understands the history of Western social philosophy through the lens of the “horns of 
these two vexing dilemmas in Man’s Nature.  A couple illustrations will help make this 
point and also illustrate his own self-reflection on his position, the soft edges.  After 
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tracing the idealist and realist positions in Paul, Augustine and Luther, Niebuhr is able to 
state that the Catholic “idealist version of human nature and of man’s community was 
closer to the truth.”
74
 But then after showing the limits of Catholic thought, particularly in 
politics and an extension of the family, he takes on the realism of Hobbes and the 
idealism of Locke.  His comment about Hobbes and Locke once more helps to illustrate 
his dichotomous lens and his dialectical method: 
The differences between the thought of Hobbes and Locke illustrate the relation 
of theories of government to the estimate of human nature.  Human freedom 
always produces disruptive as well as creative effects in the human 
community…it is important to emphasize again that both types of theory about 
human nature while they may be equally wide of the truth about human nature, do 
have these contradictory consequences in political theory.
75
  
 
Niebuhr indicates that the pessimistic theory encourages absolutism and thus sides with 
the idealist theory for it encourages the rise of free governments.  Further, this optimistic 
estimate was a “necessary” source of creative energy to challenge authority.  But he very 
quickly wants to remind us that there is a danger that Western democracy may lead to 
“mild illusions about human nature and the political order.”
76
  Again a “necessity” yet a 
warning. 
 Next Niebuhr gives credit for the vindication of an open society through not only 
by its understanding of “interest” and “power,” but rational engagement and enlargement 
of a native sympathy, a sense of justice, a residual moral integrity and a sense of the 
common good in all classes of society.” [Italics Added]
77
  Here the edges seem to have 
been more than softened, perhaps a complete break has occurred. Yet the “ sense of the 
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common good” may only be a “sense,” just like moral integrity is only “residual.” But 
they seem essential to a fuller, maybe even more “realistic” view of the human condition, 
for Niebuhr.  The question remains, where do these “senses” and “residual” elements 
reside and where are they nurtured?  Could it be in institutions? Niebuhr appears to be on 
the verge of a bigger break through in his thinking, but at least in Man’s Nature, he does 
not seem to take the next step in this chapter.  A final illustration in his most familiar 
world of international relations will help us see where he ends up, at least for this book in 
1965.  
 When talking about nations, Niebuhr will often use the language of “autonomous 
nations.”  And if not specifically using this language he assumes it.  Needless to say this 
is where he is most vulnerable to Murray’s critique and as we will see again in more 
detail below, Bellah’s approach.  Niebuhr concludes his chapter with a critique of Hans 
Morgenthau and a review of international relations during the cold war in 1965.  He 
prefaces this section with a statement that the moral problem of collective self-regard 
“has reached its climax in our day.”
78
  
The consistent tendencies of nations to seek their own interests is so marked that 
the realistic interpretation of international relations would seem to be the only 
valid description of their behavior, and possibly the only true solution to the 
problem this behavior poses.  Nevertheless it is important to raise once again the 
question whether a realistic interpretation may not err in obscuring the residual 
capacity for justice and devotion to the larger good, even when it is dealing with a 
dimension of collective behavior in which the realistic assumptions about human 
nature are most justified. [Italics Added]
79
 
  
Niebuhr in this statement is reframing his emphasis in a new direction.  He then seeks to 
answer this question by analyzing Morganthau’s  magnum opus, Politics Among the 
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Nations
80
. Niebuhr gives credit to Morganthau for his fair treatment of the pretensions 
and hypocrisy of nations to aspire to superanational ideals, which only hide the parochial 
interests of nation.  If anybody knows this world, it is Morganthau. and according to 
Niebuhr, Morganthau has a “unique reason for emphasizing the ‘national interest’ as a 
description of the most powerful collective motive and as the norm of conduct.”
81
 
Niebuhr also gives Morganthau credit as not a proponent of “arrogant nationalism.” 
Morganthau he says, is merely suggesting that it would be both honest and moral for 
nations to confess heir real motives rather than pretend to have nobler ones.”
82
  
Morganthau is against hypocrisy and pretensions.  But Niebuhr then gives his critique of 
this limited morality:  
In short, the hypocrisy of nations, as of individuals, may be an index to a residual 
creative capacity of their freedom, neither equal to nor effaced by their stronger 
impulse of self-regard.  Hypocrisy which is the tribute paid by the less acceptable 
impulse to the more acceptable one, is certainly no virtue.  On the other hand, its 
elimination by canceling out the higher loyalty offers no gain.
83
  
 
Niebuhr has a higher standard than Morganthau. What exactly is it and does it go beyond 
his usual treatment of the need to focus on realpolitik in foreign relations?  He wants to 
make sure that Morganthau does not obscure the “important residual creative factor in 
human rationality. 
The importance of establishing this residual creative freedom in the collective 
man lies not in the possibility of subordinating the lower to the higher or wider 
interest—but in the possibility that even a residual loyalty to values, transcending 
national existence, may change radically the nation’s conception of the breadth 
and quality of “national interest.”
84
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How far does he take this position?  Later he will suggest that a “moderate realism” is 
important.  It is one that suggests that national interest cannot be simply defined and the 
complexity of the situation will “refute both realistic and idealistic interpretations of 
national behavior.”
85
  Essentially where this leaves Niebuhr is an affirmation of 
“prudence” as his highest value in foreign relations.  He states it very clearly when he 
argues that “the morality of collective man in its highest reaches is governed by a wise 
apprehension of concurrent interests, rather than by a sacrifice of the lower to the higher.” 
This prudence is a modest but important triumph of human reason and sympathy 
over the tribal parochialism in human nature, which is a symbol of the limits of 
freedom in the creature who is bound to nature even while he becomes a creator 
in history. [Italics Added]
86
 
 
This is all the farther he is willing to go in his “realism” in the affairs of what he calls 
“hegemonous nations.”  It is all the farther he is willing to go for humans, though they be 
creators and agents in history, they are limited to the “limits of man as creature.”  What 
appears to be the possibility of a bigger break through in his thought, he finds a way to 
pull back and maintain some of his classic dialectical thinking.   This is still the gulf 
between individual morality and collective morality, based on his limited view human 
nature and the potential of institutions to “form individuals.”   This in the end, is his 
realism:  a prudential behavior that accounts for all factors, even idealistic capabilities.  I 
would assume that he would also want to hold out for a correct saving grace and the 
existence of common grace.   
 Where does Bellah’s “realism” connect with Niebuhr’s, if at all? 
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Robert Bellah: The New Realism 
 Niebuhr could at least point to the “necessity” of not forgetting the creative, 
though residual force in both humans and their communities, regardless of how difficult it 
was to realize.  He was also giving testimony to a different kind of realism that we had 
best not forget, in his own words: “the self needs other selves in order to be itself.”  This 
reality of our interconnectedness is the reality that Bellah and his co-authors put forth 
both in its normative sense and in the analysis of the modern world.  After the chapter 
which asserts that we “Live in Institutions,” Bellah (Again, I will use just his name as a 
shorthand for him and his co-authors, presuming two things, Bellah agrees and as stated 
in the preface to Good Society, Bellah had the larger role in drafting the framing and 
concluding chapters.) makes his case for the need in today’s world for us “to make sense 
of it,” in a chapter, entitled, “Making Sense of It.” Niebuhr suggested that we live in a 
confused time that has created a feeling of fatalism.  Bellah analyzed this as a feeling that 
our future is determined by forces beyond our control, or so it seems. 
 It is this chapter where he develops his own view of realism, in conversation with 
Niebuhr’s, which he summarizes as follows: 
Reinhold Niebuhr, for one, argued with great public effect that because of the 
tragic limitations of human nature, human beings could not help doing some evil 
in the course of doing good; yet, he continued, God commanded sinful men and 
women to bring justice to bear on human efforts, despite the ironic consequences 
that often meet such attempts.
87
 
 
Bellah goes on to recount the public debate over the best role for American politics in the 
world.  Giving credit to those who framed the issue between idealists and realists for 
many years in the United States, he suggests that in “the past two decades [the 70’s and 
80’s], however, as American preeminence in the world has receded and new forces have 
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grown, idealism and realism have become strangely detached from the actual practice of 
foreign relations.”
88
  
 Comparing Nixon, the self styled realist, with Carter, the Nibuhrian inspired but 
idealist as labeled by others, Bellah then reminds us of Reagan’s American messianism.  
How to “make sense” of these concepts today?  According to Bellah, “all idealists have 
not been hopeless dreamers, nor all realists disillusioned cynics.”
89
   He further reminds 
us that public figures like George Kennan and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., “tried to enact 
Niebuhr’s ‘moral realism,’ as a responsible moral practice of power politics in a 
complicated, ambiguous, tragically immoral world.”
90
    
 What has changed to make such distinctions to “become strangely detached from 
actual practice of foreign relations?”  The problem with any perceived failure in Carter’s 
foreign policy was not that it was too idealist but that the international political economy, 
according to Bellah was becoming too “complicated to permit effective use of the 
standard instruments of  the geopolitical strategies beloved by he realists.” This meant, 
relying less on military power and more on the power of ideas and competing 
economically.  This was the result of the fact that no one country could control either the 
flow of information or use economic weapons to punish other countries.  In the case of 
Carter, Bellah cites Carter’s attempt to punish the former Soviet Union for invading 
Afghanistan.  Other grain-supporting countries just filled the void.   A similar case was 
made in regards to Reagan’s “realism” to “bankrupt the Soviet Union through the arms 
race.  The consequence for the US was that it made us even more dependent on the 
goodwill of other nations as he created massive debts for the US economy, according to 
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Bellah.  Therefore, Bellah states that the deciding factor was not determined by the 
realist-idealist debate but by “seismic global shifts,’ where  “the complexities of 
international interdependence rendered obsolete our commonly accepted categories for 
understanding foreign policy challenges. [Italics Added]”
91
 One can only imagine what 
Bellah would have to say about President George W. Bush’s realism and idealism today 
and his attempt to craft a foreign policy of national self- interest in this interdependent 
world. 
 Where in the past a realist might say that the United States should do whatever it 
takes to “protect its self-interest,” it is clear to Bellah that today our economic life is 
dominated by a the “dynamics of a vast world market that cannot be controlled by any 
single nation-state.”  There are no autonomous nation states.  The problems of our world 
cut across all nations and threaten the security of all nations whether this is nuclear 
weapons, poverty or global warming.  The solutions are not single state solutions. Bellah 
also suggests that both the idealist and the realist perspective of the past were tied to a 
concept that nations like individuals were isolated actors.  For the realists they were in a 
Hobbesean “state of nature” of a ‘war of all against all.”  For the idealist, at least in the 
US, we were an independent actor as an example “uplifting” other nations.  Certainly 
Niebuhr’s thought did not help move out of this general theory of nations as individual 
actors.  But Bellah’s point is not so much that Niebuhr’s approach was wrong for its time, 
even though I think a case can be made that interdependence was always a fact, but that 
the global situation has made interdependence not a idealist theory of a sentimental, “we 
are all in this together.”  It is a fact that “we are all in this together.” 
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 Bellah concludes with what he sees as the challenge to “strengthen and expand 
the international institutions essential to the common good.”  We are already part of what 
he calls a global great society with many, though fragile, treaties and agreements that 
need to be strengthen.   He offers a special challenge for the US by again stressing the 
outdated distinction of realists and idealists:  
Under these circumstances, the self-interest of our nation, which the realists 
stress, cannot always be clearly distinguished from the self-interest of other 
societies, let alone be conceived in opposition to it. The idealist approach, for its 
part, assumes that the United Stats has ideals that are uniquely its own and that we 
have it in our power to spread them around the world.  If that is still true, and in 
some ways it surely is, we do not understand very well what it is that other seek to 
learn from us or how to provide them an example that will neither stifle or 
oppress them.  It would appear then that both our ideals and our interests require 
reformulation from a new more global perspective.  And it is clear that that global 
perspective is an institutional approach. [Italics Added]
92
 
  
 The new realism of interdependence for Bellah is one of the key elements in 
helping us to “make sense of our world.”  He and his colleagues in other chapters in 
Good  Society, repeat this thesis of interdependence over and over.  They make the case 
that what is needed is an institutional life that helps us understand this reality.  They see 
the difficulty of understanding this reality and therefore the need to create institutions to 
help reinforce this reality.  Part of the reason for this difficulty is  due to our profound 
disconnect from the actual world of interdependence and the American ideology of what 
he calls Lockean individualism.  In Habits of the Heart they referred to this as “radical 
individualism, as they distinguished from “expressive individualism.”  But both deeply 
ingrained individualisms worked against facing up to the fact of interdependence and 
Bellah’s value norm of the common good.  With our focus on the individual to such an 
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extent as autonomous and self-sufficient, we are totally cut off from our ability to make 
sense of our world.  This becomes what they call the “central argument” of Good Society: 
The Lockean ideal of the autonomous individual was, in the eighteenth century, 
embedded in a complex moral ecology that include family and church on the one 
hand and on the other a vigorous public sphere in which economic initiative it was 
hoped, grew together with public spirit…Both the economy and the government 
were sufficiently small-scale as to be understandable to the ordinary citizen….It 
was not inconsistent with autonomous individualism, when it was supplanted by 
religious and republican understandings of the common good, and large-scale 
institutions did not dominate individual decision.
93
  
 
This of course is not the large-scale, complex and interdependent world of today.  But 
with an psychology and ideology that hides this reality, particularly in our complex cities,  
and without sustaining institutions that make independence morally significant,” Bellah 
feels that “individual attention becomes fragmented and delimited in scope” (as pointed 
out in the previous section). This leads to a running away to private lives and a further 
focus on the pursuits that guarantee our private happiness.  With this escape from 
responsibility and a desire and capacity to understand what is happing to us, according to 
Bellah, “interdependence is both complex and fragile.”
94
   More and more the virtues of 
mutual trust and good will which were once seen as idealist become essential for the 
viability of a coherent individual and a coherent society.  As Bellah states it: “viable 
interdependence, as we have argued repeatedly, requires that participants integrate a 
cognitive understanding of their interdependence with the practical enactment of 
goodwill demanded in each institutional context.  Moving beyond just a latent necessity 
for a regard for others becomes the most urgent, and in Bellah’s terms, the most 
“realistic” challenge for modern societies today. 
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 At this point the Bellah the social scientist meets Bellah the Christian.  It is here 
that he draws on Niebuhr, not Reinhold, but H. Richard.  Quoting from Reinhold’s 
brother’s book, The Responsible Self, he “argued that all our action is a response to action 
upon us, for we are caught in an inescapable web of relationships with other human 
beings, with the natural world, and with the ultimate reality that includes and transcends 
all things---what Jews and Christians call God.”
95
   Bellah suggests that H. Richard’s 
focus at this point is just he being a good sociologist.  Once he moves to the idea of trust 
and what Christians are called to do in the world, Bellah feels Niebuhr is being both 
“sociologically realistic and religiously perceptive.”
96
   Building on H. Richard’s insights 
about trust, Bellah ends the Conclusion of Good Society with what he feels will give 
society a chance to trust.  A Christian message of grace.   
Yet, if we are fortunate enough to have the gift of faith through which we see 
ourselves as members of the universal community of all being, then we bear a 
special responsibility to bring whatever insights we have to the common 
discussion of new problems, not because we have any superior wisdom but 
because we can be, as Vaclav Hovel defines his role, ambassadors of trust in a 
fearful world.
97
 
  
It is here that Bellah and both Niebuhr’s meet with vision for the universally community.  
Reinhold’s comments about saving and common grace and his vision of the universal 
community, no doubt are partially informed by his most trusted conversation partner, his 
brother, brings us back to our tentative thesis about the real connection and continuity 
between Robert Bellah and Reinhold Niebuhr: their deep hope and confidence that the 
what is true in their faith will be born out in their analysis of the world, not in simple 
                                                 
95
 Bellah, Good Society, p. 283. 
96
 Bellah, Good Society, p. 284. 
97
 Bellah, Good Society, p. 286. 
 55 
terms but through being tested with all the factors available.  This is a calling as good 
social theorists and a calling as responsible selves. 
 What is the future of Christian Realist thought for today, particularly if we situate 
Bellah’s new realism in the broad tradition of social Christianity? 
 
IV Conclusion: Christian Realism Continuity  
 Taking a lead from Robin Lovin in his concluding chapter in Reinhold Niebuhr 
and Christian Realism, I have focused on eight areas of what Lovin calls the “classic 
formulations” of Christian realism.
98
  They are presented in Lovin’s language below as 
indicated by Italics. Using the lens of Bellah’s work, in each case I will speculate briefly 
on whether or not these formulations have been sustained or expanded by Bellah.  Much 
more can be said; but my intent is to illustrate this with just a few examples. 
 
1. The Christian Realist has a commitment to take all factors into account with no a 
priori commitment to the particular set of social, political, and economic forces that 
Reinhold analyzed.
99
  Bellah’s commitment to “grand theory” and the “classic tradition” 
in sociology has never limited the scope of his disciplinary focus.  This has insured that 
his focus has never  relied on just one set of forces that were contributing our 
understanding of the human condition.  Certainly he was not constrained by Niebuhr’s 
categories, yet he certainly matched Niebuhr’s scope as a social thinker with a 
commitment to the positive role of religion in social development especially from the 
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standpoint of  one’s faith commitment.  Bellah’s  greater constructive use of Catholic 
thought is certainly and expansion of Niebuhr. 
 
2.  The Christian Realist will not defend a narrow conception of human nature.
100
  Here 
Lovin is most concerned with feminist and other extensions of human nature to be seen 
as offsetting the often one-dimensional focus on human pride.  Bellah certainly sustains 
the Niebuhr agenda on pride.  However, his understanding of expressive individualism as 
both leading to other failings and creative outpourings sustains an expanded view of 
human nature that Lovin suggests.    But Bellah’s greatest contribution, along with others 
such as John Courtney Murray, is to see the self as an embedded self and not an atomistic 
self, abstracted from its nature as a social being.  
  
3. The Christian Realist’s patterns of argument focus on prescriptions for action that are 
based on attention to the complexity of forces at work in a situation, especially the trends 
that go unnoticed because they are pervasive, and the interests that go undetected 
because they are concealed by appeals to more general values.  Understanding how a 
social system ought to function rests on understanding how to meet the needs of human 
nature and how to avoid the distortions to which it is susceptible. To see what Christian 
Realism is, we need to attend not only to the works of those who chose the label for 
themselves.
101
  Though Bellah would be comfortable with much of the label of Christian 
Realism, he has not sought to specifically use this self-identification.  He, however,  has 
helped to make a contribution to this “classic formulation.”  He has deepened our 
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understanding of a radical individualism that has become an ideology in our 
interdependent world.  Knowing that democracy entails citizens being committed to and 
capable of “making sense” of their world, Bellah has insured that his books and ideas are 
widely accessible to concerned individuals. 
 
4.  For Christian Realists today it is not about what whether or not we can apply 
Niebuhr’s principles directly to new problems.  The question is about more general 
convictions of those who sought a “realistic theology.”  They believed that he truth about 
God must in the end prove consistent with every other kind of truth we can know, and  
they believed that by attending to reality, without insisting in advance that it conforms to 
faith’s expectations, we would in the end find “whatever ground of courage, hope, and 
faith is actually there…” that attentiveness to what Christians have thought about human 
life is likely to prove more accurate as a guide to present possibilities than any of the 
alternative understandings of the human condition.
102
 There can be no claims to moral 
and religious truth that stand in simple contradiction to the rest of what we know.
103
  This 
is the formulation that points to the “confidence” of  Niebuhr and the hope of Bellah.  
This is where the sociologist Bellah meets the person of faith.  Bellah sustains this 
element of Christian realism, even in his study of diverse cultures and “religious 
evolution.”  I am not sure he would say that Christianity would prove to be the most 
accurate guide for all, but he would say it would be the most accurate guide for him. 
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5.  The Christian Realist ventures into apologetic theology not simply to answer 
questions, but also to challenge the terms  that the questions are put. The apologist is 
always the skeptic and the critic. One of the clearest insights of Christian Realism is that 
those who hold to the Christian faith do not live only in Barth’s “strange new world of 
the Bible,” but also in the modern world whose assumptions are strange to us.
104
  As a 
person of faith in the “secular university,” Bellah has been no stranger to this role as a 
skeptic and a critic in the strange world of reductionistic epistemologies.  In fact, he has 
the vocation that Sims applied to Lewis, Carnell and Niebuhr: he has been a missionary 
to the skeptics all his life.  
  
6.  The Christian Realist proceeds with humility and with confidence.  The Christian 
Realist does not escape the distortion of insight by interest. No one does.  The confidence 
comes from the awareness that sooner or later, those who see matters differently will 
have to make their own case in realistic terms. It is important for Christian Realism that 
there is rarely a straight line from individual aspiration to social reality.
105
  Bellah like 
the Niebuhr’s, always saw his theories as partial and contingent.  He saw his Ultimate 
Reality, however, as a transcendent reality and his contingent reality under the judgment 
of God.  I have already addressed one form of confidence.  This second form flows from 
the first.  Alternate views or even views expanding the realist agenda, like Bellah’s, must 
make their case in realist terms.  Bellah’s new twist is that the new global reality makes 
the so-called idealist perspective of institutions manifesting morality of the past, the 
realism of today.  Neibuhr began to see the solution to a collectivist world as a closer 
                                                 
104
 Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 243-244. 
105
 Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr, pp. 244-245. 
 59 
harmony between the creative individual and a creative collective.  He also began to see 
“common grace” as needing this nurturing in our social institutions.  Bellah has extended 
this thinking with his theory of institutions. 
 
7.  The Christian Realist is not to talk about realistic limits, but to expand political 
imagination. When no one dares to be utopian, however, the role of the Realist may be to 
recall that the human reality also includes the capacity for such dreams.
106
  Niebuhr 
began to more fully emphasize this in his later work.  Bellah has become the consummate 
motivator for a common good. This is his value norm that he feels should be the focus for 
individuals and reinforced society as the most realistic way out of our current 
individualism. It is an individualism that neither serves the individual, as a responsible 
moral being, or society, as a good society to reinforce these values in the individual.  A 
prophetic voice needs both an audience and a way to institutionalize the vision. 
 
8. As a positive view of politics in a new century (not Niebuhr’s century) Christian 
Realism must teach us to think again about politics, so that we will not expect too little of 
it.  There is no way to achieve any of what we hope, no way, indeed, even to know what it 
is that we hope, that does not pass through politics.
107
  Bellah, wrote Habits Heart and 
The Good Society with the motivation to reinvigorate our public life.  He too analyzed the 
difficulty of Americans to have a positive view of politics.  He offers an analysis to give 
us a warning of what will happen if we ignore our political life, nothing less than a viable 
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interdependence is at stake. It will take “paying attention” to the transformation of our 
institutional life. As Bellah stated in Good  Society: 
We shall argue in this book that, in spite of the complexities and the difficulties, 
large-scale institutions can and indeed must be better understood, and they are 
amenable to citizen action and the influence of global public opinion.  To imagine 
them as autonomous systems operating according to their own mysterious logic, 
to be fine-tuned by experts, is to opt for some kind of modern Gnosticism  that 
sees the world as controlled by the powers of darkness and encourages us to look 
only to our private survival…But responsible social participation…does not come 
about just from exhortation…It is certainly not enough to implore our fellow 
citizens “to get involved.” We must create institutions ha twill enable such 
participation to occur, encourage it, and make it fulfilling as well as 
demanding.
108
 
This is the realist’s challenge today. 
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